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Abstract
Diplomacy is a seven-player non-stochastic, non-cooperative game, where agents
acquire resources through a mix of teamwork and betrayal. Reliance on trust and
coordination makes Diplomacy the first non-cooperative multi-agent benchmark
for complex sequential social dilemmas in a rich environment. In this work, we
focus on training an agent that learns to play the No Press version of Diplomacy
where there is no dedicated communication channel between players. We present
DipNet, a neural-network-based policy model for No Press Diplomacy. The model
was trained on a new dataset of more than 150,000 human games. Our model is
trained by supervised learning (SL) from expert trajectories, which is then used to
initialize a reinforcement learning (RL) agent trained through self-play. Both the
SL and RL agents demonstrate state-of-the-art No Press performance by beating
popular rule-based bots.
1 Introduction
Diplomacy is a seven-player game where players attempt to acquire a majority of supply centers
across Europe. To acquire supply centers, players can coordinate their units with other players
through dialogue or signaling. Coordination can be risky, because players can lie and even betray
each other. Reliance on trust and negotiation makes Diplomacy the first non-cooperative multi-agent
benchmark for complex sequential social dilemmas in a rich environment.
Sequential social dilemmas (SSD) are situations where one individual experiences conflict between
self- and collective-interest over repeated interactions [1]. In Diplomacy, players are faced with a
SSD in each phase of the game. Should I help another player? Do I betray them? Will I need their
help later? The actions they choose will be visible to the other players and influence how other
players interact with them later in the game. The outcomes of each interaction are non-stochastic.
This characteristic sets Diplomacy apart from previous benchmarks where players could additionally
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(a) Orders submitted in S1901M (b) Map adjacencies.
Figure 1: The standard Diplomacy map
rely on chance to win [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Instead, players must put their faith in other players and not in
the game’s mechanics (e.g. having a player role a critical hit).
Diplomacy is also one of the first SSD games to feature a rich environment. A single player may
have up to 34 units, with each unit having an average of 26 possible actions. This astronomical action
space makes planning and search intractable. Despite this, thinking at multiple time scales is an
important aspect of Diplomacy. Agents need to be able to form a high-level long-term strategy (e.g.
with whom to form alliances) and have a very short-term execution plan for their strategy (e.g. what
units should I move in the next turn). Agents must also be able to adapt their plans, and beliefs about
others (e.g. trustworthiness) depending on how the game unfolds.
In this work, we focus on training an agent that learns to play the No Press version of Diplomacy.
The No Press version does not allow agents to communicate with each other using an explicit
communication channel. Communication between agents still occurs through signalling in actions [7,
2]. This allows us to first focus on the key problem of having an agent that has learned the game
mechanics, without introducing the additional complexity of learning natural language and learning
complex interactions between agents.
We present DipNet, a fully end-to-end trained neural-network-based policy model for No Press
Diplomacy. To train our architecture, we collect the first large scale dataset of Diplomacy, containing
more than 150,000 games. We also develop a game engine that is compatible with DAIDE [8],
a research framework developed by the Diplomacy research community, and that enables us to
compare with previous rule-based state-of-the-art bots from the community [9]. Our agent is trained
with supervised learning over the expert trajectories. Its parameters are then used to initialize a
reinforcement learning agent trained through self-play.
In order to better evaluate the performance of agents, we run a tournament among different variants
of the model as well as baselines, and compute the TrueSkill score [10]. Our tournament shows
that both our supervised learning (SL) and reinforcement learning (RL) agents consistently beat
baseline rule-based agents. In order to further demonstrate the affect of architecture design, we
perform an ablation study with different variants of the model, and find that our architecture has
higher prediction accuracy for support orders even in longer sequences. This ability suggests that
our model is able to achieve tactical coordination with multiple units. Finally we perform a coalition
analysis by computing the ratio of cross-power support, which is one of the main methods for players
to cooperate with each other. Our results suggest that our architecture is able to issue more effective
cross-power orders.
2 No Press Diplomacy: Game Overview
Diplomacy is a game where seven European powers (Austria, England, France, Germany, Italy,
Russia, and Turkey) are competing over supply centers in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century.
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There are 34 supply centers in the game scattered across 75 provinces (board positions, including
water). A power interacts with the game by issuing orders to army and fleet units. The game is split
into years (starting in 1901) and each year has 5 phases: Spring Movement, Spring Retreat, Fall
Movement, Fall Retreat, and Winter Adjustment.
Movements. There are 4 possible orders during a movement phase: Hold, Move, Support, and
Convoy. A hold order is used by a unit to defend the province it is occupying. Hold is the default
order for a unit if no orders are submitted. A move order is used by a unit to attack an adjacent
province. Armies can move to any adjacent land or coastal province, while fleets can move to water
or coastal provinces by following a coast.
Support orders can be given by any power to increase the attack strength of a moving unit or to
increase the defensive strength of a unit holding, supporting, or convoying. Supporting a moving unit
is only possible if the unit issuing the support order can reach the destination of the supported move
(e.g. Marseille can support Paris moving to Burgundy, because an army in Marseille could move to
Burgundy). If the supporting unit is attacked, its support is unsuccessful.
It is possible for an army unit to move over several water locations in one phase and attack another
province by being convoyed by several fleets. A matching convoy order by the convoying fleets and a
valid path of non-dislodged fleets (explained below) is required for the convoy to be successful.
Retreats. If an attack is successful and there is a unit in the conquered province, the unit is dislodged
and is given a chance to retreat. There are 2 possible orders during a retreat phase: Retreat and
Disband. A retreat order is the equivalent of a move order, but only happens during the retreat phase.
A unit can only retreat to a location that is 1) unoccupied, 2) adjacent, and 3) not a standoff location
(i.e. left vacant because of a failed attack). A disband order indicates that the unit at the specified
province should be removed from the board. A dislodged unit is automatically disbanded if either
there are no possible retreat locations, it fails to submit a retreat order during the retreat phase, or two
units retreat to the same location.
Adjustments. The adjustment phase happens once every year. During that phase, supply centers
change ownership if a unit from one power occupies a province with a supply center owned by
another power. There are three possible orders during an adjustment phase: Build, Disband, and
Waive. If a power has more units than supply centers, it needs to disband units. If a power has more
supply centers than units, it can build additional units to match its number of supply centers. Units
can only be built in a power’s original supply centers (e.g. Berlin, Kiel, and Munich for Germany),
and the power must still control the chosen province and it must be unoccupied. A power can also
decide to waive builds, leaving them with fewer units than supply centers.
Communication in a No Press game In a No Press game, even if there are no messages, players
can communicate between one another by using orders as signals [7]. For example, a player can
declare war by positioning their units in an offensive manner, they can suggest possible moves with
support and convoy orders, propose alliances with support orders, propose a draw by convoying
units to Switzerland, and so on. Sometimes even invalid orders can be used as communication, e.g.,
Russia could order their army in St. Petersburg to support England’s army in Paris moving to London.
This invalid order could communicate that France should attack England, even though Paris and
St. Petersburg are not adjacent to London.
Variants There are three important variants of the game: Press, Public Press, and No Press. In
a Press game, players are allowed to communicate with one another privately. In a Public Press
game, all messages are public announcements and can be seen by all players. In a No Press game,
players are not allowed to send any messages. In all variants, orders are written privately and become
public simultaneously, after adjudication. There are more than 100 maps available to play the game
(ranging from 2 to 17 players), though the original Europe map is the most played, and as a result is
the focus of this work. The final important variation is check, where invalid orders can be submitted
(but are then not applied), versus no-check where only valid orders are submitted. This distinction is
important, because it determines the inclusion of a side-channel for communication through invalid
orders.
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Game end. The game ends when a power is able to reach a majority of the supply centers (18/34 on
the standard map), or when players agree to a draw. When a power is in the lead, it is fairly common
for other players to collaborate to prevent the leading player from making further progress and to
force a draw.
Scoring system. Points in a diplomacy game are usually computed either with 1) a draw-based
scoring system (points in a draw are shared equally among all survivors), or 2) a supply-center count
scoring system (points in a draw are proportional to the number of supply centers). Players in a
tournament are usually ranked with a modified Elo or TrueSkill system [10][11][12][13].
3 Previous Work
In recent years, there has been a definite trend toward the use of games of increasingly complexity as
benchmarks for AI research including: Atari [14], Go [15][16], Capture the Flag [17], Poker [3][4],
Starcraft [6], and DOTA [5]. However, most of these games do not focus on communication. The
benchmark most similar to our No Press Diplomacy setting is Hanabi [2], a card game that involves
both communication and action. However Hanabi is fully cooperative, whereas in Diplomacy, ad hoc
coalitions form and degenerate dynamically throughout the evolution of the game. We believe this
makes Diplomacy unique and deserving of special attention.
Previous work on Diplomacy has focused on building rule-based agents with substantial feature
engineering. DipBlue [18] is a rule-based agent that can negotiate and reason about trust. It was
developed for the DipGame platform [19], a DAIDE-compatible framework [8] that also introduced
a language hierarchy. DBrane [20] is a search-based bot that uses branch-and-bound search, with
state evaluation to truncate as appropriate. Another work, most similar to ours, uses self-play to
learn a game strategy leveraging patterns of board states [21]. Our work is the first attempt to use a
data-driven method on a large-scale dataset.
Our work is also related to the learning-to-cooperate literature. In classical game theory, the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) has been the main focus for SSD, and a tit-for-tat strategy has been shown
to be a highly effective strategy [22]. Recent work [23] has proposed an algorithm that takes into
account the impact of one agent’s policy on the update of the other agents. The resulting algorithm
was able to achieve reciprocity and cooperation in both IPD and a more complex coin game with
deep neural networks. There is also a line of work on solving social dilemmas with deep RL, which
has shown that enhanced cooperation and meaningful communication can be promoted via causal
inference [24], inequity aversions [25], and understanding consequences of intention [26]. However,
most of this work has only been applied to simple settings. It is still an open question whether these
methods could scale up to a complex domain like Diplomacy.
Our work is also related to behavioral game theory, which extends game theory to account for human
cognitive biases and limitations [27]. Such behavior is observed in Diplomacy when players make
non-optimal moves due to ill-conceived betrayals or personal vengeance against a perceived slight.
4 DipNet: A Generative Model of Unit Orders
4.1 Input Representation
Our model takes two inputs: current board state and previous phase orders. To represent the board
state, we encode for each province: the type of province, whether there is a unit on that province,
which power owns the unit, whether a unit can be built or removed in that province, the dislodged
unit type and power, and who owns the supply center, if the province has one. If a fleet is on a coast
(e.g. on the North Coast of Spain), we also record the unit information in the coast’s parent province.
Previous orders are encoded in a way that helps infer which powers are allies and enemies. For
instance, for the order ’A MAR S A PAR - BUR’ (Army in Marseille supports army in Paris moves to
Burgundy), we would encode: 1) ’Army’ as the unit type, 2) the power owning ’A MAR’, 3) ’support’
as the order type, 4) the power owning ’A PAR’ (i.e. the friendly power), 5) the power, if any, having
either a unit on BUR or owning the BUR supply center (i.e. the opponent power), 6) the owner of
the BUR supply center, if it exists. Based on our empirical findings, orders from the last movement
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phase are enough to infer the current relationship between the powers. Our representation scheme is
shown in Figure 2, with one vector per province.
4.2 Graph Convolution Network with FiLM
To take advantage of the adjacency information on the Diplomacy map, we propose to use a graph
convolution-based encoder [28]. Suppose xlbo ∈ R81×d
l
bo is the board state embedding produced by
layer l and xlpo ∈ R81×d
l
po is the corresponding embedding of previous orders, where x0bo, x
0
po are
the input representations described in Section 4.1. We will now describe the process for encoding the
board state; the process for the previous order embedding is the same. Suppose A is the normalized
map adjacency matrix of 81× 81. We first aggregate neighbor information by:
ylbo = BatchNorm(Ax
l
boWbo + bbo)
where Wbo ∈ Rdlbo×dl+1bo , bbo ∈ Rdl+1bo , ylbo ∈ R81×d
l+1
bo and BatchNorm is operated on the last
dimension. We perform conditional batch normalization using FiLM [29, 30], which has been
shown to be an effective method of fusing multimodal information in many domains [31]. Batch
normalization is conditioned on the player’s power p and the current season s (Spring, Fall, Winter).
γbo, βbo = f
l
bo([p; s]) z
l
bo = y
l
bo  γbo + βbo (1)
where fl is a linear transformation, γ, β ∈ Rdl+1 , and both addition and multiplication are broadcast
across provinces. Finally we add a ReLU and residual connections [32] where possible:
xl+1bo =
{
ReLU(zlbo) + x
l
bo d
l = dl+1bo
ReLU(zlbo) d
l
bo 6= dl+1bo
The board state and the previous orders are both encoded through L of these blocks, and there is no
weight sharing. Concatenation is performed at the end, giving henc = [xLbo, x
L
po] where h
i
enc is the
final embedding of the province with index i. We choose L = 16 in our experiment.
4.3 Decoder
In order to achieve coordination between units, sequential decoding is required. However there is
no natural sequential ordering. We hypothesize that orders are usually given to a cluster of nearby
units, and therefore processing neighbouring units together would be effective. We used a top-left to
bottom-right ordering based on topological sorting, aiming to prevent jumping across the map during
decoding.
Suppose it is the index of the province requiring an order at time t, we use an LSTM to decode its
order ot by
htdec = LSTM(h
t−1
dec , [h
it
enc; o
t−1]) (2)
Then we apply a mask to only get valid possible orders for that location on the current board:
ot = MaskedSoftmax(htdec) (3)
Figure 2: Encoding of the board state and previous orders.
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Figure 3: DipNet architecture
5 Datasets and Game Engine
Our dataset is generated by aggregating 156,468 anonymized human games. We also develop an
open source game engine for this dataset to standardize its format and rule out invalid orders. The
dataset contains 33,279 No Press games, 1,290 Public Press games, 105,266 Press games (messages
are not included), and 16,633 games not played on the standard map. We are going to release the
dataset along with the game engine5. Detailed dataset statistics are shown in Table 1.
The game engine is also integrated with the Diplomacy Artificial Intelligence Development Environ-
ment (DAIDE) [8], an AI framework from the Diplomacy community. This enables us to compare
with several state-of-the-art rule-based bots [9, 18] that have been developed on DAIDE. DAIDE also
has a progression of 14 symbolic language levels (from 0 to 130) for negotiation and communication,
which could be potentially useful for research on Press Diplomacy. Each level defines what tokens
are allowed to be exchanged by agents. For instance, a No Press bot would be considered level 0,
while a level 20 bot can propose peace, alliances, and orders.
6 Experiments
6.1 Supervised Learning
We first present our supervised learning results. Our test set is composed of the last 5% of games
sorted by game id in alphabetical order. To measure the impact of each model component, we ran
an ablation study. The results are presented in Table 2. We evaluate the model with both greedy
decoding and teacher forcing. We measure the accuracy of each unit-order (e.g. ‘A PAR - BUR’), and
the accuracy of the complete set of orders for a power (e.g. ‘A PAR - BUR’, ‘F BRE - MAO‘). We
5Researchers can request access to the dataset by contacting webdipmod@gmail.com. An executive summary
describing the research purpose and execution of a confidentiality agreement are required.
Table 1: Dataset statistics
Survival rate for opponents
Win% Draw% Defeated% AUS ENG FRA GER ITA RUS TUR
Austria 4.3% 33.4% 48.1% 100% 79% 62% 55% 40% 29% 15%
England 4.6% 43.7% 29.1% 47% 100% 30% 16% 49% 33% 80%
France 6.1% 43.8% 25.7% 40% 26% 100% 22% 45% 59% 77%
Germany 5.3% 35.9% 40.4% 44% 26% 39% 100% 61% 27% 80%
Italy 3.6% 36.5% 40.2% 15% 65% 56% 61% 100% 56% 25%
Russia 6.6% 35.2% 39.8% 25% 52% 77% 38% 63% 100% 42%
Turkey 7.2% 43.1% 26.0% 9% 78% 71% 56% 23% 31% 100%
Total 39.9% 60.1% 37% 59% 65% 49% 51% 50% 64%
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Table 2: Evaluation of supervised models: Predicting human orders.
Model Accuracy per unit-order Accuracy for all orders
Teacher forcing Greedy Teacher forcing Greedy
DipNet 61.3% 47.5% 23.5% 23.5%
Untrained 6.6% 6.4% 4.2% 4.2%
Without FiLM 60.7% 47.0% 22.9% 22.9%
Masked Decoder (No Board) 47.8% 26.5% 14.7% 14.7%
Board State Only 60.3% 45.6% 22.9% 23.0%
Average Embedding 59.9% 46.2% 23.2% 23.2%
find that our untrained model with a masked decoder performs better than the random model, which
suggests the effectiveness of masking out invalid orders. We observe a small drop in performance
when we only provide the board state. We also observe a performance drop when we use the average
embedding over all locations as input to the LSTM decoder (rather than using attention based on the
location the current order is being generated for).
To further demonstrate the difference between these variants we focus on the model’s ability to predict
support orders, which are a crucial element for successful unit coordination. Table 3 shows accuracy
on this order type, separated based on the position of the unit in the prediction sequence. We can
see that although the performance of different variants of the model are close to each other when
predicting support for the first unit, the difference is larger when predicting support for the 16th unit.
This indicates that our architecture helps DipNet maintain tactical coordination across multiple units.
Table 3: Comparison of the models’ ability to predict support orders with greedy decoding.
Support Accuracy
1st location 16th location
DipNet 40.3% 32.2%
Board State Only 38.5% 25.9%
Without FiLM 40.0% 30.3%
Average Embedding 39.1% 27.9%
6.2 Reinforcement Learning and Self-play
We train DipNet with self-play (same model for all powers, with shared updates) using an A2C
architecture [14] with n-step (n=15) returns for approximately 20,000 updates (approx. 1 million
steps). As a reward function, we use the average of (1) a local reward function (+1/-1 when a
supply center is gained or lost (updated every phase and not just in Winter)), and (2) a terminal
reward function (for a solo victory, the winner gets 34 points; for a draw, the 34 points are divided
Table 4: Diplomacy agents comparison when played against each other, with one agent controlling
one power and the other six powers controlled by copies of the other agent.
Agent A (1x) Agent B (6x) TrueSkill A-B % Win % Most SC % Survived % Defeated # Games
SL DipNet Random 28.1 - 19.7 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1,000
SL DipNet GreedyBot 28.1 - 20.9 97.8% 1.2% 1.0% 0.0% 1,000
SL DipNet Dumbbot 28.1 - 19.2 74.8% 9.2% 15.4% 0.6% 950
SL DipNet Albert 6.0 28.1 - 24.5 28.9% 5.3% 42.8% 23.1% 208
SL DipNet RL DipNet 28.1 - 27.4 6.2% 0.3% 41.4% 52.1% 1,000
Random SL DipNet 19.7 - 28.1 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 95.6% 1,000
GreedyBot SL DipNet 20.9 - 28.1 0.0% 0.0% 8.5% 91.5% 1,000
Dumbbot SL DipNet 19.2 - 28.1 0.0% 0.1% 5.0% 95.0% 950
Albert 6.0 SL DipNet 24.5 - 28.1 5.8% 0.4% 12.6% 81.3% 278
RL DipNet SL DipNet 27.4 - 28.1 14.0% 3.5% 42.9% 39.6% 1,000
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proportionally to the number of supply centers). The policy is pre-trained using DipNet SL described
above. We also used a value function pre-trained on human games by predicting the final rewards.
The opponents we have used to evaluate our agents were: (1) Random. This agent selects an action
per unit uniformly at random from the list of valid orders. (2) GreedyBot. This agent greedily tries
to conquer neighbouring supply centers and is not able to support any attacks. (3) Dumbbot [33].
This rule-based bot computes a value for each province, ranks orders using computed province values
and uses rules to maintain coordination. (4) Albert Level 0 [9]. Albert is the current state-of-the-art
agent. It evaluates the probability of success of orders, and builds alliances and trust between powers,
even without messages. To evaluate performance, we run a 1-vs-6 tournament where each game is
structured with one power controlled by one agent and the other six controlled by copies of another
agent. We also run another tournament where each player is randomly sampled from our model
pools and compute TrueSkill scores for these models [10]. We report both the 1-vs-6 results and
the TrueSkill scores in Table 4. From the TrueSkill score we can see both the SL (28.1) and RL
(27.4) versions of DipNet consistently beat the baseline models as well as Albert (24.5), the previous
state-of-art bot. Although there is no significant difference in TrueSkill between SL and RL, the
performance of RL vs 6 SL is better than SL vs 6 RL with an increasing win rate.
6.3 Coalition Analysis
In the No Press games, cross-power support is the major method for players to signal and coordinate
with each other for mutual benefit. In light of this, we propose a coalition analysis method to further
understand agents’ behavior. We define a cross-power support (X-support) as being when a power
supports a foreign power, and we define an effective cross-power support as being a cross-power
order support without which the supported attack or defense would fail:
X-support-ratio =
#X-support
#support
, Eff-X-support-ratio =
#Effective X-support
#X-support
The X-support-ratio reflects how frequently the support order is used for cooperation/communication,
while the Eff-X-support-ratio reflects the efficiency or utility of cooperation. We launch 1000 games
with our model variants for all powers and compute this ratio for each one. Our results are shown in
Table 5.
For human games, across different game variants, there is only minor variations in the X-support-
ratio, but the Eff-X-support-ratio varies substantially. This shows that when people are allowed to
communicate, their effectiveness in cooperation increases, which is consistent with previous results
that cheap talk promotes cooperation for agents with aligned interests [34, 35]. In terms of agent
variants, although RL and SL models show similar TrueSkill scores, their behavior is very different.
RL agents seem to be less effective at cooperation but have more frequent cross-power support.
This decrease in effective cooperation is also consistent with past observations that naive policy
gradient methods fail to learn cooperative strategies in a non-cooperative setting such as the iterated
prisoner dilemma [36]. Ablations of the SL model have a similar X-support-ratio, but suffer from
a loss in Eff-X-support-ratio. This further suggests that our DipNet architecture can help agents
cooperate more effectively. The Masked Decoder has a very high X-support-ratio, suggesting that the
marginal distribution of support is highest among agent games, however, it suffers from an inability
to effectively cooperate (i.e. very small Eff-X-support-ratio). This is also expected since the Masked
Decoder has no board information to understand the effect of supports.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we present DipNet, a fully end-to-end policy for the strategy board game No Press
Diplomacy. We collect a large dataset of human games to evaluate our architecture. We train our agent
with both supervised learning and reinforcement learning self-play. Our tournament results suggest
that DipNet is able to beat state-of-the-art rule-based bots in the No Press setting. Our ablation study
and coalition analysis demonstrate that DipNet can effectively coordinate units and cooperate with
other players. We propose Diplomacy as a new multi-agent benchmark for dynamic cooperation
emergence in a rich environment. Probably the most interesting result to emerge from our analysis is
the difference between the SL agent (trained on human data) and the RL agent (trained with self-play).
Our coalition analysis suggests that the supervised agent was able to learn to coordinate support
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Table 5: Coalition formation: Diplomacy agents comparison
X-support-ratio Eff-X-support-ratio
Human Game No Press 14.7% 7.7%
Public Press 11.8% 12.1%
Press 14.4% 23.6%
Agents Games RL DipNet 9.1% 5.3%
SL DipNet 7.4% 10.2%
Board State Only 7.3% 7.5%
Without FiLM 6.7% 7.9%
Masked Decoder (No Board) 12.1% 0.62%
orders while this behaviour appears to deteriorate during self-play training. We believe that the most
exciting path for future research for Diplomacy playing agents is in the exploration of methods such
as LOLA [36] that are better able to discover collaborative strategies among self-interested agents.
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A Tournament and TrueSkill Score
To compute TrueSkill, we ran a tournament where we randomly sampled a model for each power.
For each game, we computed the ranks by elimination order (first power eliminated is 7th, second
eliminated is 6th, ...), and the surviving powers by number of supply centers. We computed our
Trueskill ratings using 1,378 games. We used the available python package6, and the default TrueSkill
environment configuration. The initial TrueSkill σ is set to 8.33, and after 1,378 games the σ is 0.64,
which shows that the scores have converged.
Note that in our current evaluation settings we do not consider the existing power imbalance in
the game, e.g., winning as Austria is harder than winning as France. Using a more sophisticated
evaluation which includes the prior on the role of players is an interesting topic for future work.
B Effects of Graph Convolution Layers
We tested the affect of graph convolution layers by varying the number of layers in Table 6. After 8
layers of GCN there is no further improvement. We think this could be related to the fact that in the
standard map of Diplomacy the most distant locations are connected by paths of length 8.
Table 6: Effect of GCN Layers
Model Accuracy per unit-order Accuracy for all orders
Teacher forcing Greedy Teacher forcing Greedy
DipNet 61.3% 47.5% 23.5% 23.5%
8 GCN Layers 61.2% 47.4% 23.4% 23.4%
4 GCN Layers 61.1% 47.2% 23.2% 23.2%
2 GCN Layers 60.3% 45.9% 23.2% 23.2%
C Effects of Decoding Granularity
We experimented with different decoding granularity. Instead of decoding each unit order as an
atomic option (e.g. ’A PAR H’), we can decode as a sequence (e.g. [’A’, ’PAR’, ’H’]). We call the
first one unit-based and the latter token-based. We find that although the token-based model had better
performance in terms of token accuracy, it had lower unit accuracy. We also try the transformer-based
decoder. The results are in Table 7
Table 7: Comparison of different decoding granularity
Model Accuracy per unit-order Accuracy for all orders Accuracy per token
Teacher forcing Greedy Teacher forcing Greedy Teacher forcing Greedy
LSTM (order-based) 61.3% 47.5% 23.5% 23.5% 82.1% 74.4%
Transformer (order-based) 60.7% 47.5% 23.4% 23.4% 81.9% 74.4%
LSTM (token-based) 60.3% 46.7% 23.2% 23.2% 90.6% 73.8%
Transformer (token-based) 58.4% 45.4% 22.3% 22.3% 90.0% 72.9%
6https://trueskill.org/
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